I’ve been reading some stuff about identity and relative identity lately, in the process of writing something on relative identity versions of trinitarianism. This post is to share some good finds.

In his excellent entry “Relative Identity veteran logican and philosopher of language Harry Deutsch says about the best that can be said for relative identity theories – that maybe, arguably, they solve or help to solve various metaphysical problems. See his sections 2 and 4 for these. His section 5 is a penetrating analysis of Geach’s very hard to follow arguments.

Deutsch’s point of view is very different from that held by most philosophers. For this, see chapter 1 of Colin McGinn’s Logical Properties. (NDPR review.) This is more or less  the “orthodox” view that most philosophers hold, atheist or theist, trinitarian or not. I largely agree with it, except for its Platonic aspect. I uphold the logic of identity as McGinn understands it, but do not want to commit to the existence of abstracta like relations. I think the truthmaker of a sentence like “Dubya just is George Bush” is going to be a concrete object, the ex-president himself. In this, I’m in the minority; most philosophers find abstracta indispensible.

Another place one can start is Harold Noonan‘s excellent “Identity” entry. He’s an excellent philosopher, and the piece has many virtues; in particular, see his section 2 on Leibniz’s Law vs. substitutivity principles.

The best thing I’ve ever read on identity and relative identity is Continue reading »

 

Carl Mosser teaches theology at Eastern University in Pennsylvania.

I recently read, and profited much from his Classifying Mormon Theism. Check it out.

It’s part of a book dedicated to the work of the unique Mormon philosopher of religion David Paulsen.

Mosser’s paper is of interest for several reasons:

First, is Mormonism a sort of polytheism, monotheism, or what? You’ll have to read the paper to get Mosser’s answer. But here’s a teaser: “It is inappropriate to classify Mormonism as a polytheistic religion. To do so conveys highly misleading connotations.” (p. 23, emphasis added)

Second, what is monotheism anyway? What is a god?

Third, how did the ancients, including the authors of the Bible use “God” and related terms? For example, how was the Greek theos used? And how does this compare to our usage?

I don’t think I agree with all of Mosser’s conclusions; but there is a lot going on here, and there is much that is useful.

 

 

 

 

Congratulations to trinities contributor J.T. Paasch on his “Arius and Athanasius on the Production of God’s Son”, which has come out in the most recent issue of the prestigious philosophy of religion & philosophical theology journal, Faith & Philosophy (Vol. 27, No. 4, October 2010, pp. 382-404)

Hey JT – do you have a preprint posted online anywhere?

Here is JT’s abstract, to whet your appetite:

Arius maintains that the Father must produce the Son without any pre-existing ingredients (ex nihilo) because no such ingredients are available to the Father. Athanasius denies this, insisting not only that the Father himself becomes an ingredient in the Son, but also that the Son inherits his divine properties from that ingredient. I argue, however, that it is difficult to explain exactly how the Son could inherit certain properties but not others from something he is not identical to, just as it is difficult to explain the precise way that a statue inherits certain properties but not others from the lump of bronze it is made from.

Also, check out his blog Boring Things.

 

After my 2004 piece in which I gave three arguments against “social” trinitarianism, I had the privilege of being taken to Hask refuted twice by the excellent veteran Christian philosopher William Hasker.

This last summer, I finally got around to replying. I wrote a long piece and sent it to Religious Studies, who had published my original article and one of Hasker’s replies. They generously agreed to take it – it seems, they’d about had a belly full of social Trinity discussions – but only on the condition that I cut it way back. So I  took out the axe and hacked off 2/3 of it.

I hope to use some of this other material elsewhere – it gets into some really interesting early modern material, tries to further negotiate the divide between Hasker and I, and delves more into the issue of defining monotheism.

My reply, then, is short and sweet tart. I stick pretty closely to Hasker’s arguments.

My thanks to Bill for a lot of very helpful correspondence, on this, and on other papers we’ve (separately) written. It turns out that Religious Studies also granted him a short reply to my reply in that same issue – but you’ll have get that counter-punch from him or wait until the March 2011 issue comes out.

Update: the issue is now out – I got the hard copy at the end of March 2011.

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