JT: Right about Lat. IV– but that was in 1215, and Rick St. Vick died in 1173. In any case, Rick doesn’t seem clear exactly on causal powers. He says the HS proceeds from God (Deus = divinitas), and elsewhere he says HS proceeds from Father and Son. I’m sure he’d go with the Lat. IV view– it is just that he doesn’t seem as nuanced on the production of divine persons issue, in which case he might be read in either way. In any case, I only mentioned this as an example of how the abstract/concrete distinction might fail to capture what Rick St. Vick was up to.

Only the barest notion of “thing” is required – one which applies to anything that can be thought of. Certainly, in the theory at hand, none of the Three is (strictly) identical to either of the others. Ergo, three things. Perhaps they constitute one god, but that needs to be shown.

It’s a little worrisome that because of the Trinity we’re ready to discard the abstract vs. concrete distinction, as well as the universal vs. particular distinction – I mean, you’re saying that neither division is mutually exclusive. But I think they’re defined that way, so in your/his view, there just are no such distinctions to be made.

Or perhaps, you want to completely allow both distinctions, and go negative mysterian about God – God (or “the divine nature”) is somewhat universal like as well as somewhat particular like, and somewhat like both an abstract thing, and like a concrete thing. I doubt, though, that saying this results in any theologically useful, positive conception of the divine nature…

Analogy: I’ve got a friend. It’s much like a male, and much like a non-male. And it’s much like a human, and much like a non-human. And it’s somewhat like a dog, and equally so, somewhat like a non-dog. Also, it is like a cheese-sandwhich, but also like a non-cheese sandwhich. I assume you’ll agree that in a sense, I haven’t really said what sort of friend I have.

Yes: “two non-identical things should share all and only the same constituents” is false. There is one constituent shared by all divine persons, but each divine person has a constituent the others lack, namely a personal property. I’ll let Rea speak for himself …

Talk of ‘universal’ vs ‘particular’ properties is somewhat misleading. And again, so is talk of abstract vs. concrete properties. I take it that lots of people think of abstract properties as properties that have no causal umph, and concrete properties do have causal umph. But, what if I believed that the divine substance is universal-like and that it has causal umph? So, it’s like a ‘particular’, but a particular that can be shared by more than one ‘person’ (= Aristotelian primary substance?).

So, for every divine person there’s two particulars: the shareable divine substance and a personal property.

There’s tons more to be said. So yeah, the divine nature is both a universal and a particular—- or rather, it is a peculiar sort of universal (not just any old universal).

Smaller bites, please!

About the classification, I think I need a chart.

Let me try to sum his theory, on your reading:

Richard thinks that each member of the Trinity has two part/constituents, namely (1) the divine nature (which is a universal, not a particular), and (2) a personal property. (So while the divine nature may be simple, no person is. And if “God” refers to the Trinity, God isn’t simple.) This divine nature is thrice “exemplified” but is NOT thrice “instantiated”, thus it is not thereby “divided” among the Three.

Some comments:

We’ve got three things, each of which has the same sort of claim on being divine. Ergo, there are three gods here, monotheism is false. No?

I’m afraid I don’t know what to make of the “dividing” talk… maybe I need to read more Cross on this…

About your top level genus: Rea is committed to thinking of the divine nature quasi-material stuff shared by the Three, but is he also committed to each person having some other constituent, i.e. a personal property? I take it you’re assuming that this is impossible: that two non-identical things should share all and only the same constituents.

And “personal properties” are particulars, right – neither instantiable nor exemplifiable. So this theory requires both universal and particular properties?

Again, is he saying that the divine nature is both a universal and a particular? If so, that hurts.

1. What exactly is an ‘essential accidental form’? Aren’t ‘essential’ and ‘accidental’ opposites?

2. What’s the reasoning behind choosing to talk about this in terms of ‘accidental forms’? Why not, say, substantial forms? Don’t most people agree that there are no accidents in God?