So it is not merely a state of affairs, but some scholastics posit arguments from the powers of the DE as acted on by an agent (or agents in the case of the production of the Holy Spirit) for why there are other divine persons, and a certain number of divine persons at that.

I think Joseph’s is a good question about why does D + F count as a person? Well, on Henry’s model, what we can loosely call a ‘material constitution’ (substance as matter is a characeterized matter- it isn’t like prime matter, but like an element with certain properties ex se, e.g. divine intellect, divine will, divinity, etc.) model, it is somewhat an easy answer: there is per se unity of D and F, and this unity is called a person. And, given that (D+F) have the powers of intellection and volition, it ‘passes’ some notion of personhood; even more, there is a positive incommunicable property (F) that allows us to pick out this person from that.

On this model, the Father can’t ‘have F’ precisely b/c the name ‘Father’ consignifies two properties (D+F). So, if you say, ‘the Father loves me’, you could say ‘(D+F) loves me’. But again F is not a ‘thing’ distinct from D, rather it is only a (real) mode of D.

But is it true to say that ‘Father’ is just a state of affairs? Well, if you take D+F as having a per se unity, rather than a per accidens one, then it is not precisely a ‘state of affairs’ but ‘one thing’?

As for J’s question (4), I suppose this model prevents saying the Father is one God, and the Son is another God precisely b/c they have the same D.

As for (5): “if one says these relational properties are incompatible”.. what would make being a Father and being a Son incompatible? Or rather, are you saying ‘actively generating a Son’ and ‘(passively) being generated (as a) Son’ are incompatible? In other words, how could D both be active and passive? A good question. Henry’s way through this is to say active powers are correlatives of passive powers, and that neither are ‘founded on motion’, such that these powers are just correlatives and don’t have to be taken to presuppose temporal change, or any change or prime matter. If there is an active power, then there is a passive power. You just have to be willing to think that the very same substance can be active and passive as regards the same action (e.g. understanding, or generating/being generated, or spirating/being spirated).

Some quick points:

1. I still think D should be the entity identical to God. D is a divine thing/substance. Isn’t God any divine thing/substance?
2. Why think states of affairs are persons? It’s the substance that has personal properties not the states of affairs, right? I have the property of being a person. The state of affairs of my being a person is not a person.
3. But if you think of D as a substratum, things fall into place. Then I see why D is not identical to God and how the divine Persons can be states of affairs that are complexes of the substratum and a property.
4. What qualifies T as God? Why don’t F, S, and H also count as Gods? And why don’t F+S, S+H, and F+H also count as Gods? If there aren’t such complexes, how can there be T, which is F+S+H?
5. Finally, I still think there’s a problem that T, as it is D having P, Fi, and Sp should qualify as a Father, a Son, and a holy Spirit? If one says these relational properties are incompatible, so that nothing can have both, e.g. P and Fi, then it seems F and S can’t share the same substratum, i.e. D.

Best,

Joseph