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	<title>Comments on: Richard of St. Victor 11 &#8211; Response to the Argument From Love Thus Far (Scott)</title>
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	<description>theories about the father, son, and holy spirit</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Mon, 30 Jan 2012 22:44:18 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>By: Dennis</title>
		<link>http://trinities.org/blog/archives/1053/comment-page-1#comment-91842</link>
		<dc:creator>Dennis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 22 Mar 2010 06:03:14 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Hello, I would like to present a case for R.St.V’s proof for the necessity of a three person God. Here is the jist of the problem raised by Scott, in his own words:

“What seems much less obvious is Richard’s claim that perfect love is satisfied only by three mutual lovers. Suppose we accept his intuition that perfect love entails (at least) three mutual lovers, but why not more than three?..In book 4 he’ll give an argument for why there are exactly three divine persons, but not from his notion of perfect love…It seems then that Richard gives up on the idea (if he seriously held it) that he can argue from perfect love that there are exactly three mutual lovers.” 

I propose that R.St.V DID in fact “seriously” hold that the necessity of the Trinity can be argued from perfect love. In fact, I shall present one such of R.St.V’s arguments. 

Scott here draws two conclusions which I believe to be incorrect. (1) R.St.V does not argue from supreme love for an exact trinity. (2) Richard’s aim is not to find the necessity of only a Trinity. Instead, R.St.V actually argues for a necessity of at least three persons (i.e. three or more). Point (2), it should be noted, follows from (1). 

In book IV, Richard does indeed argue for a trinity of persons by appealing to a notion similar to the indiscernibility of identicals. But Scott, I believe, has overlooked an important feature of Richard’s argument that leads him to (1). The origin of persons in part grounds their distinctions. Procession, for instance, is a relationship resulting from origin which provides personal distinction in the divine substance. But analogous to procession of origin is what R.St.V calls a procession of Love. Yves Congar calls this concept a manner of “realizing love”. Congars sums R.St.V’s thoughts on this point, explaing that love is realized by “either {1} pure grace, or {2} it is received and giving, or {3} it is purely received and due.” The manner in which the persons of the Trinity realize love, for Richard, may be a sist, a mode of being, and therefore not grounded in origin. But even if the manner in which the persons of the Trinity realize love occurs due to their ex-sist(ance), I believe there is reason enough to see that divine and supreme love has not been abandoned by Richard as the grounds for his general argument.

Put another way, R.St.V does argue from perfect love for an exact Trinity. He says that the procession of love is one way in which the Divine Persons are distinguished. Further, he believes this procession of love may not be a result of anything. It’s just one of the ways God is. Alternatively, the procession of love may be like the procession of origin (an exist) , or even grounded in the procession of origin. 		
	
In either instance, the procession of love proves that R.St.V does believe that an exact Trinity can be argued for from love.  With (1) on shaky ground, (2) also tumbles. Further, Richard’s argument appears to be valid. Therefore R.St.V’s trinity calculus of the procession of love must be recognized and its strength tested.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hello, I would like to present a case for R.St.V’s proof for the necessity of a three person God. Here is the jist of the problem raised by Scott, in his own words:</p>
<p>“What seems much less obvious is Richard’s claim that perfect love is satisfied only by three mutual lovers. Suppose we accept his intuition that perfect love entails (at least) three mutual lovers, but why not more than three?..In book 4 he’ll give an argument for why there are exactly three divine persons, but not from his notion of perfect love…It seems then that Richard gives up on the idea (if he seriously held it) that he can argue from perfect love that there are exactly three mutual lovers.” </p>
<p>I propose that R.St.V DID in fact “seriously” hold that the necessity of the Trinity can be argued from perfect love. In fact, I shall present one such of R.St.V’s arguments. </p>
<p>Scott here draws two conclusions which I believe to be incorrect. (1) R.St.V does not argue from supreme love for an exact trinity. (2) Richard’s aim is not to find the necessity of only a Trinity. Instead, R.St.V actually argues for a necessity of at least three persons (i.e. three or more). Point (2), it should be noted, follows from (1). </p>
<p>In book IV, Richard does indeed argue for a trinity of persons by appealing to a notion similar to the indiscernibility of identicals. But Scott, I believe, has overlooked an important feature of Richard’s argument that leads him to (1). The origin of persons in part grounds their distinctions. Procession, for instance, is a relationship resulting from origin which provides personal distinction in the divine substance. But analogous to procession of origin is what R.St.V calls a procession of Love. Yves Congar calls this concept a manner of “realizing love”. Congars sums R.St.V’s thoughts on this point, explaing that love is realized by “either {1} pure grace, or {2} it is received and giving, or {3} it is purely received and due.” The manner in which the persons of the Trinity realize love, for Richard, may be a sist, a mode of being, and therefore not grounded in origin. But even if the manner in which the persons of the Trinity realize love occurs due to their ex-sist(ance), I believe there is reason enough to see that divine and supreme love has not been abandoned by Richard as the grounds for his general argument.</p>
<p>Put another way, R.St.V does argue from perfect love for an exact Trinity. He says that the procession of love is one way in which the Divine Persons are distinguished. Further, he believes this procession of love may not be a result of anything. It’s just one of the ways God is. Alternatively, the procession of love may be like the procession of origin (an exist) , or even grounded in the procession of origin. 		</p>
<p>In either instance, the procession of love proves that R.St.V does believe that an exact Trinity can be argued for from love.  With (1) on shaky ground, (2) also tumbles. Further, Richard’s argument appears to be valid. Therefore R.St.V’s trinity calculus of the procession of love must be recognized and its strength tested.</p>
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